ImageSat International
This is the Web page for the Israeli EROS A spysat. (The one launched by Russia that the Taiwanese are using to spy on the PRC.)
Wednesday, August 15, 2001
Censorship in action: why I don't publish my HDCP results
I have written a paper detailing security weaknesses in the HDCP content protection system. I have decided to censor myself and not publish this paper for fear of prosecution and/or liability under the US DMCA law.
Monday, August 13, 2001
Net activists launch campaign to jam 'Echelon'
Internet privacy activists and "hacktivists" have announced a day-long cyber-protest intended to jam a computer surveillance network whose existence isn't acknowledged by the governments said to run it.
Sunday, August 12, 2001
Satellite Vulnerability: a post-Cold War issue?
The widely discussed use of US reconnaissance satellites during the Gulf War will strongly motivate future regional adversaries to seek ways of countering US space-based assets. The presumption that reconnaissance satellites can operate covertly is obsolete. Tracking US reconnaissance satellites can provide valuable support to a hostile country's concealment and deception programs. Iraq's ability to conceal both major weapons programs and many SCUD launchers is a warning of the serious consequences such programs can have. Space surveillance systems of the type likely to be acquired by Third World countries are inconspicuous and may well go undetected, while direct ascent ASAT rockets are within the reach of many countries. This article argues that fundamental reexamination of the functions and architecture of US overhead reconnaissance is needed, and should be done outside the traditional Cold War bureaucratic structures.
The widely discussed use of US reconnaissance satellites during the Gulf War will strongly motivate future regional adversaries to seek ways of countering US space-based assets. The presumption that reconnaissance satellites can operate covertly is obsolete. Tracking US reconnaissance satellites can provide valuable support to a hostile country's concealment and deception programs. Iraq's ability to conceal both major weapons programs and many SCUD launchers is a warning of the serious consequences such programs can have. Space surveillance systems of the type likely to be acquired by Third World countries are inconspicuous and may well go undetected, while direct ascent ASAT rockets are within the reach of many countries. This article argues that fundamental reexamination of the functions and architecture of US overhead reconnaissance is needed, and should be done outside the traditional Cold War bureaucratic structures.
Mike McCants' Satellite Tracking TLE ZIP Files
The "McCants" weekly file has approximately 1570 LEO satellite elements (including elements on classified satellites). This file is updated daily about 4:25PM Central Time. The "higher drag" and "visual" elements are updated daily. The other OIG elements are updated on Wednesday and Thursday afternoons. The classified objects are updated whenever I receive and process observations.
The "McCants" weekly file has approximately 1570 LEO satellite elements (including elements on classified satellites). This file is updated daily about 4:25PM Central Time. The "higher drag" and "visual" elements are updated daily. The other OIG elements are updated on Wednesday and Thursday afternoons. The classified objects are updated whenever I receive and process observations.
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